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Good institutional quality (function) and similar institutional design (form) can promote 
international trade by reducing transactions costs. We evaluate the relative importance of 
function versus form in a gravity model, using an indicator of different legal systems as a proxy 
for differences in form together with indicators of overall institutional quality. We find that good 
institutions promote trade much more than similar legal systems and have much more 
explanatory power. This effect is economically large –up to 10 times the effect of different legal 
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In recent years we have been witnessing a shift of effort into changing specific 
institutions so that they are standardized across countries (institutional harmonization). In 
particular, policymakers, governments and multilateral agencies have promoted harmonization of 
institutions as a way to promote trade, presumably by reducing transactions costs or as a way to 
protect the distribution of gains from economic activity (or capture them). For instance, the WTO 
has been pushing forward the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement 
(that was signed in 1994 and then amended in 2003 and 2005) which aims to standardize how 
intellectual property is protected across countries.  The debate on regulatory standards – like 
pasteurization to ensure safety of traded milk products – is another example. Competition law 
and enforcement, which were on the negotiating table in the earlier Doha rounds of trade talks is 
yet another example
2. A key policy question for developing countries is how important it is to 
standardize particular institutions versus just trying to get them to work better overall in each 
country
3. This question has hitherto not been addressed in the literature. 
We evaluate empirically the relative importance for international trade of institutional 
harmonization versus institutional quality, while differentiating the impact of overall institutional 
quality from the impact of institutional diversity on trade. Anderson and Marcouillier (2002) 
estimate the effect of two measures of institutional quality – “Transparency” (of government 
policies) and “Enforceability” (of legal contracts) – but do not control for differences in form. 
We use differences in legal origins as a proxy for institutional diversity, and three different 
                                                 
2 Market forces, that is, consumer tastes and producer innovations may also increase pressures for voluntary, rather 
than policy induced standardization and changed trading patterns. 
3 This is especially important since the latter may be an easier, less costly goal to accomplish and potentially more 
effective.    
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measures of institutional quality: bureaucratic quality, control of corruption and protection of 
property rights. We employ two methods in order to evaluate the relative importance of 
institutional quality versus differences in legal systems. The first is to estimate how much more 
trade would be induced by a reasonable change in institutional quality versus how much is 
deterred by differences in legal systems. This method serves as an evaluation of possible policy 
outcomes
4. The second method is to evaluate the relative contribution of institutional quality 
versus differences in legal systems in explaining the variation in trade using beta coefficients, 
and serves as a way to evaluate explanatory power in practice. 
The results are striking. As expected, institutional quality has a positive effect on bilateral 
trade, while differences in legal origin have a negative effect on trade. But we estimate that the 
effect of institutional quality is much higher than the effect of differences in legal origin on trade 
– in some estimates up to ten times higher. By this we mean that, for the average trading pair, a 
reasonable and achievable improvement in institutional quality
5 can increase bilateral trade much 
more than harmonization of their legal systems (in the typical case legal origins are different). 
We also find that institutional quality explains 5-15 times more of the variation in bilateral trade 
flows, relative to differences in legal origins. 
Moreover, we find that the effect of differences in legal origin is estimated to be lower 
than some of the other factors that affect trade. For example, infrastructure quality turns out to be 
an important determinant of trade; the number of telephone lines per capita has an effect of up to 
10 times the effect of differences in legal origin. The telephone lines per capita are also estimated 
to have an effect on trade that is 2-3 times the effect of institutional quality.  
                                                 
4 We admit to the well known caveat of inferring effects of policy from regression coefficients. However, without a 
structural model that takes into account institutional factors in a meaningful way, this is the best we can do. 
5 Nevertheless, this may prove to be no easy feat. We discuss this further below.    
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These results inform policy: the first order of business should be just getting your 
institutions to work rather than worrying about the trade-related effects of institutional 
standardization. 
In order to estimate the separate effects of institutional form and function on trade we had 
to use a measure of institutional diversity that is not perfectly correlated with institutional 
quality. The measure we use to proxy for institutional diversity is differences in legal origin. 
While some empirical work shows that different legal origins affect institutional quality (La 
Porta et. al. [1997, 1998, 1999]), other work (Berkowitz et al. [2003], Pistor et al. [2002, 2003] 
and Acemoglu, ([2001, 2004]) argue that the nature of the process by which institutions are 
transplanted and developed, rather than legal origin which affects institutional quality. In fact, 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) provide some evidence showing that legal family, while affecting 
the type of financial intermediation that occurs, does not affect economic activity overall
6. Nor is 
legal origin a good instrument for institutions that reflect the relation between the state and 
citizens. 
7 Moreover, there is no reason that a mere difference in legal origins signals any 
particular level of institutional quality. We elaborate on this below.  
 
Background and Literature 
Good institutions reduce the transactions costs associated with doing business (North [1991, 
1994]), and, in particular, should promote trade because they reduce the severity of holdup 
problems. International trade conducted across great distances and intertemporal lags suffers 
from potentially large transactions costs. Importers are more likely to purchase from a seller if 
they can be assured that they are getting what they paid for; and in case they do not get it, what 
                                                 
6 Growth, investment and financial development. 
7 Though they do find it to be a good instrument for aspects institutions picking up private contracting relationships 
between citizens. In particular, they find it to be a good instrument for particular measures of judicial effectiveness.    
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kind of recourse is available. Exporters are more likely to sell to a partner that is constrained to 
honor commitments, where mutual commitments can be written into contracts which can be 
enforced. They are also more likely to get access to finance for trade if institutions are good (see 
literature below). 
Differences in endowments, preferences and history have led to the development of 
different institutional forms to achieve broadly similar objectives. Moreover, differences in 
formal institutional design occur partly because of differences in norms or informal institutions 
(and vice versa). 
But how important is it for trade that institutions are similar? If country A’s laws and 
courts are different from country B’s, A and B will incur some cost in getting to know each 
other’s institutions and in writing contracts compatible with each others’ systems. Each would 
prefer the other partner to have the same institutions. But in the real world, this is generally not 
possible for all the institutions that affect trade. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, a great deal of 
effort does go into changing specific institutions so that they are standardized across countries.  
Having the same set of institutions may increase trade, but this would entail identifying 
the best institutions and getting all those trading partners not having these institutions to bear 
some cost to obtain them. This is hardly a simple matter for at least 3 reasons: (a) there is not a 
“best” design for all institutions; (b) there is a pecuniary cost to changing laws/regulations, 
which might prove to be quite large and (c) changing institutions would mean changing the 
distribution of benefits which would create resistance by losers. Since global rules determine 
inter-country claims on resources or assets, it is difficult to say which rule is the most desirable
8. 
Moreover, in some situations, discussed below, formal harmonization may not increase trade but 
                                                 
8 Even if a rule were found that truly maximized global gains, ceteris paribus, the resulting distribution of gains may 
not be desirable from either a “global” or individual country point of view.    
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instead may alter the pattern of trade or even reduce it by blocking entry into markets. So in the 
absence of a best solution, the emphasis on harmonization at the policy level may be misplaced
9. 
Although the governments and multilateral organizations who support standardization of 
institutions claim to do so to promote trade, governments and others may be doing so with a view 
to restricting trade, or affecting overall trading patterns and profits for their constituencies. We 
cannot distinguish between harmonization of institutions that is motivated by attempts to limit 
market entry of competing producers, policy changes intended to promote trade and 
harmonization induced by changing consumer preferences (which would be associated with 
rising trade). However, we are really interested in the case of policy induced harmonization. 
Finally, as in the field of technology there is always a potential conflict between the (cost-
lowering) benefits of standardization and the dynamic gains from potential innovations and 
diversity.
10  
We draw on three strands of the economics literature – institutional economics, 
international trade and fiscal decentralization – to provide a theoretical background for the work. 
First we draw on the extensive institutional economics literature such as the seminal works by 
North (1991, 1994), Grief, Milgrom and Weingast (GMW, 1994), Greif (1989, 1993a), Milgrom, 
North and Weingast (1990), who study the link between institutions and economic exchange 
within and between nations. According to North (1991, 1994) in order to gain from increasing 
specialization and division of labor in economic production it is necessary for society to develop 
institutions that support impersonal and anonymous exchange across time and space. As 
individuals and groups become increasingly interdependent, more complex institutional 
                                                 
9 Institutional harmonization may occur because of private forces – that is because firms will push for changes to 
raise their profits or it may occur as a result of policy decisions. 
10 Establishing standards may facilitate trade but once a standard (institution or technology) has been adopted, there 
is a cost to changing it. When there is no pressure for standardization, a continuous search for better methods could 
have a higher potential for innovation.    
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structures are necessary to capture the potential gains from trade. GMW and Grief use game 
theoretic modeling to explain the development of institutions supporting information exchange, 
respect for property rights and contract enforcement that support the historical emergence of 
long-distance trading relationships. In their analyzes, the development of merchant guilds as 
organizational units that shared information and whose members acted in a coordinated manner, 
facilitated dealings with medieval rulers and merchants who in turn respected merchants’ 
property rights. Though each guild’s precise institutional form varied they performed similar 
functions.  Acemoglu et al (2002) examine how trading opportunities in Europe led to the 
development of institutions to further support trade. 
Pistor et al (2001)
11 analyze how competition between trading states in Europe (notably 
England and France) promoted the development of company law in these countries. While the 
laws differed in form, both England and France moved to an impersonal system which granted 
the right to incorporate as a company based on a set of predetermined criteria rather than 
patronage. World Bank (2001) examines the effect of international trade on institutions in and 
vice versa as do Wei (2000) and Islam and Montenegro (2001).
12 Together, these papers show 
either (a) how trading opportunities and competition led to the emergence of institutions to 
enhance trade volumes or (b) how the development of effective institutions supported more 
trade. 
The international trade literature is divided into three strands in terms of the perspective 
taken in analyzing the relationship between institutions and trade. The first strand, represented by 
papers by Anderson and Marcouillier (2002), Levchenko (2004), Souva et al (2005), is closely 
                                                 
11 See also World Bank (2001). 
12 There is a large literature treating the impact of institutions on economic exchange in various areas (such as the 
financial sector, agriculture ) and on income and growth. It is vast, and is not summarized here. Acemoglu et al 
(2004) have a good summary of the literature linking institutions to growth. We mention only some important 
papers that relate institutions to international trade and link directly with our paper.    
7 
related to the above papers as they explain the value of institutions to international trade through 
their impact on information asymmetries, property rights and contract enforcement. Anderson 
and Marcouillier develop a model in which corruption and poor contract enforcement reduce 
trade between countries. They contend that gravity models that omit the impact of institutional 
quality on trade produce biased estimates and their empirical estimation confirms this. 
Levchenko models institutional differences as a source of comparative advantage and shows 
among other things, that developing countries may not gain from trade due to the poor quality of 
their institutions and that factor prices may diverge as a result of trade when institutional quality 
varies among trading partners. Souva et al (2005) examine the relative importance of political 
versus market institutions for trade and conclude that it is the latter that counts.  
Another strand, the game theoretic literature, focuses on standard setting (standards being 
rules and therefore a form of institution) as a means of limiting entry and competition in markets. 
This is the approach taken in Brander and Spencer (1985), Fischer and Serra (2000), Barrett 
(1994) and Kennedy (1994).  In these models government policy and standards/regulations are 
designed with a view to limiting entry and keeping competitors out of the market (or gaining 
market share) rather than with a view to lowering transactions costs.
13 
Eisenmann and Verdier (2001) distinguish between different types of rule-setting 
behavior that could be used to regulate trade while meeting other domestic objectives. These are: 
(1) unilateral, (2) negotiated reciprocity where countries agree to set their standards in a mutually 
beneficial way, with harmonization as a special case, and (3) mutual recognition defined as 
agreeing on ultimate objectives but leaving the definition of the means at the discretion of the 
country.  In this case countries trust each others’ certification processes. In such a system, 
                                                 
13 Brander and Spencer’s seminal article deals with government subsidies but the concept has been generalized to 
cover standards and other regulations affecting trade flows.    
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countries would have different institutional forms to meet similar objectives.
14 Baldwin (1970) 
argues that given differences in initial conditions, world trade will be divided between rich 
countries linked together by mutual recognition agreements and less developed countries that 
face hegemonic harmonization (rules set by rich countries).  The world is divided since poor 
countries cannot meet the requirements of rich countries and thus are limited in their trading 
ability. He concludes that in reality harmonization is a practical goal only for countries that are 
not “too” different. In Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999) theoretical work they contend that it does 
not make sense to look at individual determinants of market access since several factors together 
determine actual access to a market.  In their framework, regulations/standards and tariffs work 
together, an increase in one in a given country can be offset by a decline in another.  One of their 
main messages is that if governments were granted more sovereignty over their policy choices, 
(one policy choice being not to harmonize institutions), but asked to maintain a given level of 
market access, GATT’s principles would deliver globally efficient outcomes.  
The third strand of the economics literature, the fiscal federalism literature is also 
relevant for this paper. Essentially, issues related to international trade, international agreements 
and institutions are an extension of the fiscal federalism issues faced by sovereign states with the 
difference that a supra sovereign authority to impose discipline or redistribution does not exist.   
   Alesina and others (2001, 2002), Casella and Feinstein (1990), and Sachs and Sala-i-
Martin (1997) among others have differentiated between the economic and the political desires 
to unify or harmonize countries’ policies and institutions in the context of multiple sovereign 
nations trading together.  Much of this work has focused on the particularities of the 
progressively tighter links between the members of the European Union (EU).  In fact, these 
                                                 
14For example, different processes could be used to ensure food safety.    
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authors contend that much of the pressure for harmonization comes from the desire to have a 
tighter political union.  
Casella and Feinstein (1990) develop a model in which an initial expansion in trade is 
accompanied by the integration of political units (or a degree of institutional harmonization) in 
order to support trading activity.  Over time increased profitability of trade in larger markets 
leads to reduced transactions costs and a desire for political diversity.  This is accompanied by 
less harmonization.  Therefore, depending on the relative returns to diversity (which are 
increased with heterogeneous preferences and endowments) and standardization (lower 
transactions costs); the outcomes will differ over time and for different groups of countries (see 
also Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2001)). Sykes (2000) and Sauve and Zampetti (2000) find that 
neither complete harmonization nor diversity (or what Sykes calls competition) between trading 
partners is always desirable and the relative merits of each depend on the degree of externalities. 
Alesina, Angeloni and Schunecht ‘s (2002) summary of how the EU treats legislation 
within member countries and a discussion of the types of policy areas that could benefit from 
centralization or standardization shows that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find areas where à 
priori countries will always favor standardization (will always gain from harmonization) or 
always favor diversity.
15  
The first strand of the economics literature generally concludes that good quality 
institutions promote trade. The second and third strands of the literature indicate that a priori, it is 
not possible to say whether global rule setting resulting in forced institutional standardization 
will be accompanied by more trade or not and that the gains from standardization to individual 
countries is an empirical matter. Moreover, within countries where there are no restrictions on 
trade in goods or factors, institutional diversity co-exists with free trade.  
                                                 




We set out to estimate the effect of institutional diversity on international trade relative to 
that of institutional quality. We would like to know which effect is bigger in an economic sense 
and to evaluate their relative explanatory power. Our analysis is based on estimating a gravity 
equation, which is basically an empirical relationship between bilateral trade flows and market 
size (GDP) and distance between country-pairs. This relationship has theoretical foundations, as 
discussed in Anderson (1979). We include other variables that potentially capture direct costs to 
trade (and have become “standard procedure” in the practice of gravity equation estimation); as 
well as other variables that potentially capture indirect costs to trade.  
We use differences in legal origin as a proxy for institutional diversity. The fact that all of 
the origins of legal systems are European countries that – apart from transition economies – 
which are rich and have comparable incomes, would lead us to presume that differences in legal 
systems matter less than their functionality.  
In general, it is difficult to find a measure of institutional diversity that is independent of 
institutional quality. The legal literature and some of the economics literature (see for example 
Watson (1993), Epstein (1995), Zweigert and Kotz (1987) and World Bank (2001)) discuss 
design differences among different legal systems, for example, procedural differences. La Porta 
et al (1997, 1998, 1999), Beck Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) among others, have linked 
differences in legal origin to overall institutional quality. In particular, these studies contend that 
French legal origin countries tend to have poorer quality institutions and therefore poorer 
outcomes, such as lower financial development.     
11 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that good institutions developed when colonizers 
introduced institutions of private property rather than pursuing an extractive strategy. Thus, 
institutional quality in developing countries is not determined by the legal origin of the country, 
but by the incentives of the colonizer to set up good institutions regardless of legal origin. In 
another paper, Acemoglu et al. (2004) relate the development of economic institutions to 
inequalities in the distribution of resources and political institutions rather than legal origin. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) contend that while legal origin may be related to the quality of 
certain types of institutions (they focus on some aspects of the judiciary, or what they call 
contracting institutions), it is not a good instrument for institutions that regulate interactions 
between the state and citizens (for example, measures of corruption, bureaucratic efficiency or 
protection of property rights). Moreover, they show that contracting institutions have an effect 
only on the type of financial intermediation that occurs, but not on economic activity overall
16; 
they instrument for contracting institutions with legal origins.  
Legal scholars contend that different legal origins and formal legal systems do not signal 
differences in overall quality, but merely reflect differences in designs and procedures that reflect 
historical circumstances but that are independent of the overall quality of legal systems. For 
example Pistor et al. (2001, 2002 and 2003), Berkowitz et al (2003) contend that it is the method 
of transplantation rather than inherent “badness” of French institutions/legal origin that makes 
certain institutions perform worse in poor countries.  The negative association between French 
legal origin and institutional performance would be picking up the worse performance of French 
colonized lands with respect to other lands. These authors attempt to distinguish between the 
influence of legal family versus the impact of other aspects of the legal transplantation 
relationship (such as readiness of the country for new laws, familiarity with the new laws) and 
                                                 
16 Growth, investment and financial development.    
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find the latter to be a more important determinant of legal development. The relationship 
between legal family and legal system development is found not to be robust. Mattei (1998) 
contends that simply looking at formal differences among civil- and common-law legal systems 
says little about how institutions really work in practice.  
In sum, there is sufficient evidence to support the view that the focus on legal families as 
a determinant of institutional quality is misplaced and that legal family is not associated with 
economic outcomes. Moreover, even if our institutional quality measures are related to specific 
legal origins – in the sense that countries that have Common Law system have better institutions 
than countries that have Civil Law systems – it does not imply that institutional quality would be 
higher or lower in country-pairs that have different or similar legal origins. We illustrate this 
point with a few examples. France and the U.K. have different legal systems, and both exhibit 
good institutional quality, whereas Togo and Ghana also have different legal systems, but both 
do not exhibit good institutional quality. Of course, examples do not say much about the average. 
In the data, the simple correlation between difference in legal origins and institutional quality is 
in fact positive, but not very large (see Table 3). 
Difference in legal origins it is not a time varying variable, and is a proxy for sources of 
current diversity that are related to history. Its dependence on the past lends to its exogeneity to 
current trade flows. In a recent paper, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2005) use a similar 
indicator to capture differences in legal origin as a regressor in a gravity equation, but they do 
not simultaneously control for institutional quality.  
We use three different measures of institutional quality: Bureaucratic Quality, Control of 
Corruption and Protection of Property Rights. These three seemed to us to be most important for 
trade a priori. For example, Bureaucratic Quality and Control of Corruption capture the    
13 
efficiency of customs control, licensing and other regulatory bodies, and whether extra payments 
are required in order to “smooth” or expedite customs clearing and other legal procedures. The 
indicator “Protection of Property Rights” captures elements such as the business environment 
and risk of hold-ups and expropriation of shipments – both at the source and at the destination. 
Anderson and Marcouillier (2002) use two related measures of institutional quality (from a 
different source) – “Transparency” (of government policies) and “Enforceability” (of legal 
contracts) – but do not control for differences in form. 
 
We estimate gravity equations of the following general form, 
 
ln(Tijt)= δ·dlegorij + π·Iijt + Wijtβ + Xijtγ + vijt , 
 
where T is the trade flow between a country-pair; dlegor is an indicator for different legal origins 
of countries i and j (it does not vary over time); I is the sum of an institutional quality index for 
countries i and j (we have three such indices); W is a set of “gravity” controls, some of which are 
mandated from the standard gravity model and some capture various direct costs to trade; X is a 
set of additional controls which will be used for testing robustness; and v is an i.i.d. error term. 
We interpret the coefficient δ as the half-elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to dlegor; that 
is, it captures the effect of different legal origins for the average trading pair. We interpret the 
coefficient π as the half-elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to institutional quality; that is, it 
captures the effect of increasing institutional quality index of either the importer or exporter by 
one unit.    
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W, the set of “gravity” controls, includes the log of distance between a country-pair, the 
log of the product of the two countries’ GDP, log of product of land area, the number of 
landlocked countries in the bilateral relationship (0, 1 or 2), the number of island countries in the 
bilateral relationship (0, 1 or 2), an indicator for a common border, an indicator for a common 
language and an indicator for a common currency
17. Our baseline specification is thus 
 
ln(Tijt) = δ·dlegorij + π·(Iit+Ijt) + β1ln(distanceij) + β2ln(GDPit·GDPjt) + β3ln(areait·areajt) + 
β4landlockedij + β5islandsij + β6borderij + β7common_languageij + β8currency_unionijt + vijt . 
 Eq. (1) 
 
X, the set of additional controls, includes permutations of the following groups of 
controls in different specifications. One set of controls is for colonial ties; it includes an indicator 
for a common colonizer and an indicator for colony-colonizer relationship. Another set of 
controls is for trade agreements; it includes indicators for both countries being members of the 
WTO, only one country being a member of the WTO, an indicator for country-pairs that are 
members of the General System of Preferences, and an indicator for regional trade agreements. 
In one version, tariffs between country-pairs are used
18. The last controls are for infrastructure 
quality: the log of product of the number of telephone lines per 1,000 people, and the log of 
product of road length per 1,000 people. 
                                                 
17 We also experimented with estimating gravity equations that include GDP per capita. If preferences are non-
homothetic, then this can be an important determinant of preference for non-local, traded goods. However, given the 
nature of our regressor, we decided not to report estimates that include this variable. Results that do include GDP per 
capita as a regressor are not materially different and are available upon request. 
18 Including colonial ties and trade agreements is particularly important for our analysis, because they potentially 
pick up institutional similarities over and above legal origins. We elaborate on this when we describe our results.    
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Standard error estimation always takes into account the clustering by country-pairs. The 
coefficients are estimated by OLS or IV, where the latter estimator takes into account the 
potential endogeneity of institutional quality to trade and measurement error of institutional 
indicators.  In the IV estimations, we instrument our measures of institutional quality by absolute 
latitude (Hall and Jones (1999), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003), Easterly and Levine 
(2003))
19.  
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) stress that consistent estimation of gravity equations 
requires, at the minimum, adding country dummies which capture price levels in each country
20. 
However, our institutional quality indices are collinear with a full set of country dummies. There 
is very little time variation in these indices. Therefore, if we wish to control for country effects 
we must choose which ones to include. We choose to estimate all our specifications without any 
country dummies. 
                                                 
19 Additional IV estimates using ethnic fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003) as an instrument are available 
upon request. 
20 A more efficient structural estimation procedure would be 3SLS. However, this approach relies on a specific price 





Our data set builds on that of Rose (2004)
21. Unless otherwise stated, the data are from 
that source; see our Table 1 for a concise description. Most of the variables from that source are 
standard and do not merit an elaborate description here (see Rose (2004) for complete details), 
except for the regress and in all our estimations: the log of average bilateral trade flows. The 
direct source for this variable is the IMF’s “Direction of Trade” dataset. This variable is the 
average of all four potentially available trade flows between a country-pair (exports from i to j, 
imports into j from i, etc’). This implicitly imposes symmetry on the effects of the determinants 
of trade, which means that we are estimating the effect of a change in the regressors both on 
exports and imports
22. This seems to be a plausible assumption for some regressors (e.g., 
distance), but not for all (e.g., tariffs vis-a-vis a trading partner). We deal with this issue below. 
We focus our study on the 1984-1999 sample due to restrictions on the availability of 
data on institutional quality. Our measure of dissimilarity of institutional form is a dummy for 
different legal origins. This dummy is equal to 1 when a country-pair does not share the same 
legal origin and zero otherwise. Legal origins are from Djankov et al. (2003) and the CIA 
Factbook. Two of our measures of institutional quality are Bureaucratic Quality and Control of 
Corruption; they are taken from the commonly used International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
dataset, are available from 1984 and cover 135 countries for which we have trade data, although 
coverage is not complete in all years. Our third measure of institutional quality is Protection of 
Property Rights; it is taken from the Heritage Foundation dataset, is available from 1995 and 
                                                 
21 Available at Rose’s web site, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/ 
22 See Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2005) for a framework that does not impose this restriction.    
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onwards, and covers 154 countries for which we have trade data. Here coverage is almost 
complete for all years. Using two independent sources which employ different methodologies 
contributes to testing the robustness of our results. A full list of countries can be found in the 
appendix. We use the sum of the index for a country-pair as a regressor; that is, Iijt = Iit + Ijt . This 
reflects the aforementioned symmetry built into our data.
23  
Our measures of infrastructure quality are the number of telephone lines (landlines plus 
cellular phone lines) per 1,000 people, and the total country road length per 1,000 people; they 
are taken from the World Development Indicators and are available for the entire sample.  
We obtained bilateral tariff data from the TRAINS dataset (via the World Bank) for 
1988-99. Use of this data immediately eliminates observations from 1984-87. Although this is 
the most elaborate bilateral tariff dataset we are aware of, the coverage of the bilateral tariffs of 
all trade pairs in this sample is patchy (in the later years the coverage is significantly better than 
in the early years) and considerably reduces the sample size in regressions in which it is used. As 
a regressor, we use (trade-weighted average across goods) bilateral tariffs, averaged for each 
country-pair. As with institutional quality, the averaging reflects the symmetry assumption. We 
chose to average rather than to sum in order to make results easy to interpret. For many country-
pairs the tariff data was available for only one country. In these cases, we treat the tariff of that 
country as the “average” of both. This procedure is used in order not to lose too many data points 
in the estimation of specifications with tariffs. Even so, the tariff data cover only 43% of the 
entire sample for which trade and institutional data are available. This restriction hardly changes 
the overall representation of country-pairs in the panel. However, using tariff data the sample is 
                                                 
23 We chose not to use the World Bank’s “Governance Matters” (see Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 
2005) institutional quality indicators because its country- and especially year-coverage is less complete than our 
institutional indicators. Nevertheless, these indicators are highly correlated with our institutional indicators. 
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somewhat biased toward industrialized countries, especially in the earlier years of the panel; this 
is because many country pairs that consist of less-developed countries do not have bilateral tariff 
data for either one. Therefore we perform all regressions with and without controlling for tariffs. 
We use the sum of absolute value of latitude for a country-pair as an instrument for 
institutional quality variables. The latitude variables are taken from the CIA Factbook. 
In Table 2 we report summary statistics for all our regressors. Sixty-five percent of the 
country-pairs in our sample do not share the same legal origin. Our institutional quality variables 
exhibit significant variation. It is noteworthy that the average tariff variable has some extreme 
outliers, usually due to countries that trade very few products and impose a high tariff vis-à-vis 
each other
24. In Table 3 we report correlations that were of interest to us a priori
25. Notably 
among these correlations is the small positive correlation between trade flows and different legal 
origins. The institutional quality variables are highly correlated among themselves. The 
institutional indicators also exhibit a relatively high correlation with trade flows, telephone lines 
and with roads. Our two infrastructure indicators are also correlated, which will lead us not to 
estimate specifications using both in order to avoid multi-colinearity problems. Not surprisingly, 
tariffs are negatively correlated with trade. They are also negatively correlated with institutional 
quality.  
                                                 
24 It is also indicative that average tariffs between trade-pairs (even trade-weighted) mask huge variation in tariffs 
among different products for each trade-pair. 
25 All correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level except for correl(regional,comcol), which is not 





Our baseline results are summarized in Tables 4-6. Each table presents results for a 
different measure of institutional quality – Bureaucratic Quality, Control of Corruption and 
Protection of Property Rights. As mentioned above, we estimate separate equations for each 
indicator due to their high correlation. Since our tariff data is available for only 43% of the 
sample for which trade data are available, we estimate all specifications first without tariffs and 
then add them as a regressor. We address the potential endogeneity of institutional quality to 
trade by instrumenting for the sum of institutional quality with the sum of absolute latitude for 
each country-pair. 
Our estimates imply that different legal origins do have a detrimental effect on trade, 
between 10% and 25%, depending on the specification of our regressions
26. This is a large effect.  
Using a similar variable, Helpman Melitz and Rubinstein (2005) find a slightly larger impact in 
their regressions; this could be because they do not control for institutional quality. Our estimate 
for the detrimental effect of tariffs yields an elasticity of 1 to 2, thus every percentage point 
increase in tariffs decreases trade by 1%-2% on average. 
However, we also find large positive effects of institutional quality on trade – in some 
cases very large. In order to assess this effect, the last line in Tables 4-6 report the effect of a 
change of one standard deviation in institutional quality on trade
27. For instance, take 
Bureaucratic Quality in Table 4; our estimates imply that one standard deviation increases trade 
by 50%-120%. This is a much larger effect than that of differences in legal origins. A similar 
                                                 
26 The largest point estimate is in table 6, column 4. The effect is exp{-0.29}-1 = -0.25. 
27 The percent increase in trade due to 1 s.d. of institutional quality is calculated as follows: exp{coef*sd}-1.    
20 
picture emerges for our other two institutional quality indicators in Tables 5-6 in terms of 
magnitudes. The IV estimate of the coefficient to Bureaucratic Quality is larger than the OLS 
estimate when tariffs are not included (column 2 vs. 1), but smaller when tariffs are included as a 
regressor.  
In order to further illustrate the magnitudes that our estimates with fixed effects and 
tariffs imply, we provide some examples of an increase of one unit (not standard deviation) in 
the institutional quality index around the mean. Ceteris paribus, had Colombia had the 
Bureaucratic Quality of Costa Rica (one unit more in the index), it would have traded 60 percent 
more with its trading partners on average. Had Brazil curbed corruption to the extent that Chile 
does, it would have traded 32 percent more with its trading partners on average. And had the 
Dominican Republic protected property rights as well as Ecuador does, it would have traded 43 
percent more with its trading partners on average.  
These magnitudes should not be taken at face value, since all institutional quality indices 
are highly correlated and an increase in one index implies an increase in the rest. Rather, the 
estimates should be understood as capturing the general institutional environment, where an 
increase in one dimension probably involves all the rest. In sum, we find that the effect of better 
institutional quality vastly outweighs the detrimental effects of different legal origins. 
 
Relative Explanatory Power 
One way to try to evaluate the relative importance of differences in legal systems versus 
institutional quality is using beta-coefficients (known also as “standardized regression 
coefficients”)
28. A beta coefficient tells us how many standard deviations the regressand would 
                                                 
28 Beta coefficients are computed by fitting a regression to standardized variables (subtracting the average and 
dividing by the standard deviation).    
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change in response to a change of one standard deviation of the regressor. Taking this approach 
to evaluate relative importance is not without problems. The coefficients are interpreted in terms 
of standard deviations, but the standard deviations of the variables are not equivalent, perhaps 
not even comparable. Yet, this method does allow us to evaluate the relative explanatory power 
of each variable. A larger beta coefficient (in absolute value) implies that a regressor explains a 
larger amount of variation in the regressand. We now turn to describe the estimation results. 
Panel A of Table 7a reports OLS estimates of specifications that have the same gravity 
(W) variables as in tables 4-6, but with different combinations of institutional quality indicators. 
Panel A is given for completeness. We focus on Panel B, which reports the beta coefficients of 
those specifications. The main point to take from Panel B is that our institutional variables have 
much more explanatory power for trade than differences in legal origins. Thus, not only the 
effect of a marginal change is larger, as described above, but there is a lot more scope for 
affecting trade through improving institutional quality, relative to legal harmonization. 
In column (1) we see that the beta coefficients to Bureaucratic Quality, Control of 
Corruption and Protection of Property Rights are roughly 3.6, 1.6 and 4.6 larger than the one 
estimated for differences in legal origins, respectively. From this we may conclude that 
institutional quality has significantly more explanatory power relative to differences in legal 
origins. In column (1) we also see that among our three institutional quality variables, Control of 
Corruption, with a beta of 0.032, has less than half the explanatory power of Bureaucratic 
Quality and roughly a third the explanatory power of Protection of Property Rights for trade. Of 
the latter two, property rights seem to have slightly more explanatory power for trade. 
Bureaucratic Quality captures the efficiency of customs and Protection of Property Rights 
capture the scope for legal recourse. We may conjecture inefficient customs procedures and    
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insecure property rights (e.g., higher probability of successful hold-ups) may be more 
detrimental to international trade than general corruption and paying bribes. 
The specification in column (1) can be estimated only in the years 1995-1999 due to the 
availability of our property rights indicator. Therefore we estimate a similar specification in 
column (2) without property rights, in 1984-1999. A similar pattern emerges. The beta 
coefficients to Control of Corruption and Bureaucratic Quality are roughly 4.6 and 7 times larger 
than the one estimated for differences in legal origins, respectively. In columns (3)-(5) we report 
the beta coefficients for each institutional quality indicator separately. Notice that these are 
exactly the same specifications as the first columns in Tables 4-6. The results keep the pattern 
described above, with the explanatory power of Control of Corruption and Bureaucratic Quality 
estimated an entire order of magnitude larger than differences in legal origins. 
One problem with the previous exercise is the interpretation of the beta coefficient of 
differences in legal origins. Since this is an indicator variable that takes only the values of zero 
and one, it is not clear how a country would change it by one standard deviation. We address this 
problem by estimating the same specifications as in Table 5 where each country’s only trade 
partner is the hypothetical average of its trading partners
29. More specifically, we replace all the 
variables in Eq. (1) that are indexed by j, i.e. partners of country i, by their average for country i. 











j i J GDP
i J
GDP , 
which is the average GDP of country i's trading partners, where J(i) denotes the number of such 
partners. We note that J(i) is a function only of i and is kept the same for all variables for a given 
                                                 
29 We thank Bill Easterly for suggesting this exercise.    
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year, so that the averaging concept is the same for all variables. Other variables that are denoted 
both i and j are simply averaged. Thus equation (1) becomes 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t i J t i J i J i J i J i J
i J i t i J it i J t i J it i J t i J
v union currency language common border islands landlocked
area area ln GDP GDP ln distance ln I I dlegor T ln
) ( ) ( 8 ) ( 7 ) ( 6 ) ( 5 ) ( 4
) ( 3 ) ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) (
_ _ + + + + + +
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β β β β β
β β β π δ
Eq. (2) 
 
The averaging procedure serves as a way to smooth the legal differences variable and 
thus making the beta coefficients easier to interpret. However, the averaging procedure changes 
the interpretation of the standard coefficient to dlegor.  ) (i J dlegor  denotes the average “different-
ness” of country i from its trading partners. It is still bounded between zero and one, but is now 
continuously distributed on the unit interval. A change from one to zero implies now that a 
country has moved from a situation in which it was different from all its partners to a situation it 
is fully legally harmonized with them. The full size of the coefficient should be interpreted as the 
implied increase in trade for such a scenario.  
This is different from the previous specifications, in which the coefficient to dlegor was 
to be interpreted as the change in trade vis-a-vis a particular partner. For instance, a country may 
match its legal system to that of one trading partner but not to another, since there are 5 legal 
systems in our data. This aspect of the data is lost in the averaging procedure. Therefore, the 
magnitude of the coefficient should not be compared with other estimates.  
Due to the linearity in their construction, our institutional quality variables, ( ) t i J it I I ) ( + , 
keep their previous interpretation, where one can contemplate a one-unit change in country i's 
institutional quality index in the same way we have done above.     
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We report the results of estimating equation (2) in Table 7b, where we replicate the same 
combinations of institutional variables as in Table 7a. The pattern in Table 7b is similar to that is 
Table 7a. In column (1) we evaluate the relative importance of all institutional variables and the 
degree of “Different-ness” in Legal Origins.  
As before, we focus on Panel B, but we note two things about the estimates in Panel A. 
First, in columns (1) and (5), we see that the estimates of the coefficient to Different-ness in 
Legal Origins are much larger than our previous estimates. One should remember here that the 
coefficients are not comparable, as they pertain to different situations. Second, in column (1) we 
see that the coefficient on Control of Corruption is very small, negative and not statistically 
significant; in column (2) it is positive and smaller still. This is due to colinearity with our other 
institutional variables, as is evident from column (4), in which the coefficient on Control of 
Corruption is large, positive and statistically significant. 
The results in Panel B convey a similar message as in Table 7a. The beta coefficients to 
Bureaucratic Quality and Protection of Property Rights are 2.4 and 1.6 times larger that the beta 
coefficient to Different-ness in Legal Origins. The beta coefficient to Control of Corruption is 
much smaller now. Here, it is Bureaucratic Quality that has the highest beta coefficient. In 
columns (2) and (3) we see that the beta coefficient to Bureaucratic Quality is more than 5 times 
larger than the beta coefficient to Different-ness in Legal Origins. In column (4) the beta 
coefficient to Control of Corruption is also more than 5 times larger than the beta coefficient to 
Different-ness in Legal Origins. Here the coefficient is driven by the high correlation with 
Bureaucratic Quality. In column (5) the beta coefficient to Different-ness in Legal Origins is 
quite large; the beta coefficient to Protection of Property Rights is but 1.2 times larger. However,    
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in light of the results in column (1), we can safely conclude that institutional quality has much 
more explanatory power than Different-ness in Legal Origins. 
 
Robustness: cross-sections 
One issue that one might have with our IV estimates is that our instrument is not time-varying, 
while our instrumented variable is time-varying. In order to address this concern we re-estimate 
the specification in columns 1-2 in Tables 4-6 on cross sections of 5-year averages. Our sample 
is 16 years long, so we take averages over three 5-year periods: 1985-90, 1991-94 and 1995-99. 
Our averaging procedure takes into account the fact that some year observations for a country-
pair might be missing; in order to avoid dropping too many observations we average over the 
years for which data are available, within the 5-year period. We choose not to estimate 
specifications with tariffs in order to avoid too much imputation out of the tariff data, thus asking 
too much from already scant tariff data: some of the average tariff data points already exist for 
only one country as it is (see description in The Data subsection) ; moreover, many year 
observations for tariffs are missing. 
The results are reported in Tables 8-10 and are in line with the estimates from the annual 
frequency sample. Interestingly, the estimates for the effect of different legal origins in Tables 8-
9 – when Bureaucratic Quality or Control of Corruption are controlled for – are much smaller 
than in the previous ones, sometimes small enough not to render statistical significance. The 
largest estimate is found in Table 8 in column 2: 18% less trade due to different legal origins. 
However, the estimates in Table 10 – when Protection of Property Rights is controlled for – are 
larger than before: 26% (OLS) and 32% (IV) less trade due to different legal origins.     
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Our estimates for the effects of institutional quality on trade are on the same order of 
magnitude as before and more. The IV estimates for Bureaucratic Quality imply an increase of 
318%, 154% and 88% in trade per one standard deviation of the index in the three sub-samples. 
The IV estimates for Control of Corruption imply an increase of 182%, 92% and 54% in trade 
per one standard deviation of the index in the three sub-samples. The IV estimate of the effect on 
trade of an increase of one standard deviation of the property rights protection index – is 139%, 
which is twice as large as the estimate in Table 6. Some of these estimates are very large, but 
they are consistent with the large explanatory power of our institutional quality variables. 
Moreover, a change in one standard deviation may overstate the relevant change for policy. 
 
Robustness: additional controls 
Another objection to our results might arise from omitting other variables that seem important 
for trade a priori and that might be correlated with other variables. Therefore, we introduce 
another set of controls, adding them one by one and then all together in the end: colonial ties, 
trade agreements and infrastructure. The results are reported in Tables 11-13 as follows: column 
1 replicates column 1 from Tables 4-6; in columns 2-4 we add each control variable separately; 
and in column 5 all additional controls are included. In column 6 we also control for tariffs. In all 
of the estimation results the effects of the additional controls are in the expected direction and 
meaningful magnitudes. 
In all of these robustness checks colonial ties decrease the effect of different legal origins. 
This is to be expected, since many countries inherited their legal systems from their colonizer. 
Indeed, colonial ties are negatively correlated with different legal origins, but far from being a    
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perfect correlation, at only -0.25 (see Table 3). However, the effects of our institutional quality 
measures do not change with the introduction of colonial ties. 
Controlling for trade agreements increases the effect of different legal origins in Tables 
11 and 12 (but not in Table 13). This is surprising; trade agreements are generally written so as 
to be acceptable regardless of the legal system and presumably would reduce the impact of 
differences induced by differences in legal origin on trade.  We would expect that differences in 
institutional design would be less important for countries that have regional or other trade 
agreements, since these agreements are a source of harmonization.
30 Interestingly, the coefficient 
on membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is estimated to be large, negative and 
statistically significant. Rose (2004) finds smaller negative effects which are statistically 
insignificant, using the same data in a longer sample (1945-99)
31. Thus, once institutional quality 
is controlled for, WTO membership seems to be detrimental to trade, or at least does not promote 
it. To the extent that the WTO aims at promoting trade through reduced tariffs or through 
institutional harmonization, it seems that it is not promoting trade through either channel. The 
effects of our institutional quality measures on trade decrease slightly when trade agreements are 
controlled for. 
Controlling for telephone lines decreases the effect of differences in legal origins in 
Tables 11 and 12 (but not in Table 13) and the effect of our institutional quality measures on 
trade decrease by roughly a half. However, a one standard deviation change in institutional 
quality has a larger effect on trade than differences in legal origins. In Tables 11 and 12 the 
effect remains an order of magnitude larger. Better means of communication are highly 
correlated with better institutional environments (see Table 3). Better communications most 
                                                 
30 Differences in legal origin are not significantly negatively correlated with membership in regional agreements, 
that is, trade agreements are not more likely to be made between countries with similar legal systems. 
31 However, the number of reporting countries in the sample is much smaller in the earlier part of the sample.    
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probably promote better institutional quality since they allow better control and flow of 
information; and better institutions probably translate into better infrastructure, including 
infrastructure in telecommunications. In Tables 11 and 12, the estimated elasticity of trade with 
respect to telephone lines is roughly 0.23, which is reasonable; given this coefficient, an increase 
of one standard deviation of this variable increases trade by 85%. Thus the effect of telephone 
lines may be 10 times as large as different legal origins. Moreover, this effect is roughly twice 
the effect of institutional quality. In Table 13, the coefficient to telephone lines is smaller, at 
0.18; this implies a smaller effect of one standard deviation of this variable, 62%. This is still 2.5 
times the effect of different legal origins and also twice the effect of Protection of property 
rights.  
Our second measure of quality of infrastructure is roads per 1,000 people. The results are 
qualitatively the same, but the overall effect of this variable is smaller. The effects of 
institutional quality in these regressions are estimated larger than when telephone lines were 
included instead in Tables 11 and 12. In those tables the elasticity with respect to roads is 
roughly 0.12, which implies an increase in trade of roughly 20% due to an increase of one 
standard deviation in the roads variable; this is still twice the effect of different legal origins, but 
half the effect of institutional quality. 
However, in Table 13 the effect of roads is much smaller than different legal origins. The 
elasticity is only 0.04, which implies an increase in trade of only 6% due to an increase of one 
standard deviation in the roads variable. This is but a fraction of the effect on trade of one    
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standard deviation in Protection of Property Rights (47%). Since this variable is collinear with 
telephone lines we do not report estimation results when both are used as regressors
32.  
In sum, we can say that infrastructure is an important determinant of trade, in most cases 
more important than differences in legal origin and without diminishing the role of institutional 
quality. An increase of one standard deviation in the telephone lines variable seems to entail an 
effect on trade of roughly twice the effect of one standard deviation of our measures of 
institutional quality. Roads have only half the effect of institutional quality, or less. However, 
this comparison should be considered with caution, as we are comparing a real variable with an 
index. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the relative importance. 
When all controls are added we find that the effect of institutional quality is smaller than 
without them. This is not surprising, since good institutions are correlated with other indicators 
of economic development that promote trade. The effect of an increase of one standard deviation 
in the Bureaucratic Quality index falls from 88% to 32%; for Control of Corruption it falls from 
70% to 18%; and for Protection of Property Rights it falls from 57% to 22%. However, the effect 
on trade of different legal origins also diminishes, and in Tables 11-12 it becomes small enough 
not to render statistical insignificance. Therefore, our main result – that institutional quality 
matters more than differences in legal origins – holds. 
When, in addition, we control for tariffs we find a larger effect of different legal origins. 
However, given the special nature of the sub-sample for which tariff data are available, we 
should treat this result with caution; the results are driven mostly by industrial countries, for 
which tariff data exist. Nevertheless, they are in line with our other estimates. 
 
                                                 
32 Doing so rendered a negative coefficient to roads and did not change much the coefficient to telephone lines. This 
is due to the colinearity of these two variables. The results for differences in legal origin and institutional quality 
hardly change in this case. These results are available upon request.    
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Robustness: subsamples of rich and poor countries 
To assess better the relative importance of institutional quality versus differences in legal origins 
we split the data into two subsamples.  The first, “Rich Partner” subsample includes all 
observations in which at least one country in the pair has PPP GDP per capita greater than 
10,000 dollars in 2000. This effectively excludes all pairs in which both countries have less than 
that income. The second, “Poor Partner” subsample includes all observations in which at least 
one country in the pair has PPP GDP per capita less than 10,000 dollars in 2000. This effectively 
excludes all pairs in which both countries have more than that income
33. The GDP data were 
taken from the World Development Indicators
34. A list of 31 countries that define the Rich 
Partner subsample is reported in the appendix. 
We estimate the same baseline specifications of Tables 4-6 on the two subsamples of 
country-pairs. The results are reported in Tables 14-16. In all three tables the first two columns 
replicate the first two columns of Tables 4-6 for convenience. The next two columns report 
results for the same specification for the Rich Partner subsample, while the last two columns 
report the results for the Poor Partner subsample. We keep here the practice of using IV 
estimators for all subsamples to correct for potential endogeneity and measurement error.  
The estimates in Tables 14-15 for Bureaucratic Quality and Control of Corruption exhibit 
a similar pattern. First, differences in legal origin are more important when at least one trading 
partner is rich than when at least one trading partner is relatively poor. Second, the opposite is 
true for institutional quality; it is more important when at least one trading partner is relatively 
poor. Moreover, the relative importance of institutional quality versus different legal systems is 
                                                 
33 The results reported below hold for a broad range of cutoff incomes. These results are available upon request. 
34 These are published by the World Bank.    
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much larger when a trading partner is relatively poor than when one trading partner is relatively 
rich.  
For example, in the Poor Partner subsample one standard deviation of either Bureaucratic 
Quality or Control of Corruption is associated with an increase in trade that is more than 6 times 
larger than the decrease in trade due to different legal origins. The actual magnitude is 
economically large: an 84-130% increase in trade due to one standard deviation of Bureaucratic 
Quality and 71-74% increase in trade due to one standard deviation of Control of Corruption. In 
the Rich Partner subsample the OLS estimates assign a more modestly larger effect to the 
institutional quality variables, but the IV estimates reverse this and let the difference in legal 
origins have a larger effect. In calculating the impact on trade we took the standard deviation in 
the relevant subsample. Summary statistics in each subsample are reported in Table 17.  
What can explain this pattern? If institutional quality is higher in rich countries, then it 
may cease to be a binding constraint for trade and legal differences become more important. 
Since our data do not allow disentangling the effect on imports and exports, we can only 
conjecture that this is true. In Table 17 we can see that all institutional quality variables have 
higher means and lower variances in the Rich Partner subsample than in the Poor partner 
subsample. The statistical properties of the indicator for different legal origins are not 
significantly different in the subsamples.  
The picture for Protection of Property Rights in table 16 is slightly different, although it 
conveys a similar message. The OLS e estimator yields a similar coefficient to differences in 
legal origin in all subsamples, which is higher than in Tables 14-15. The coefficient to Protection 
of Property Rights is also similar in all subsamples. However, the IV estimator assigns a small 
negative coefficient to Property Rights in the Rich Partner subsample, which is statistically not    
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significant. This might be due to the reason we mentioned above, that when institutional quality 
is high enough it ceases to be a binding constraint and increasing it may not increases trade. The 
coefficient to different legal origins is also smaller than in other subsamples in this table.  
In the Poor partner subsample the picture is similar to the previous tables; Protection of 
Property Rights has a much larger effect on trade than differences in legal origin – between 2 and 
3 times larger. The economic magnitude is similar to increasing Control of corruption: 57-79% 
increase in trade due to an increase of one standard deviation of Protection of Property Rights. 
In sum, it appears that for relatively poor countries it is more important to increase 
institutional quality than to harmonize legal systems. This is not a trivial finding. Although 
poorer countries tend to have worse institutions and thus have larger scope to improve 
institutional quality, it is not straightforward that the relative importance of institutional quality 
versus differences in legal systems is higher in poorer countries. In other words, the marginal 
effect on trade of an increase in institutional quality seems to be higher in poorer countries, but 
also relatively higher with respect to differences in legal origins. 





  In this paper, we have estimated the impact of institutions on bilateral trade flows 
in a gravity equation. The question we are specifically asking is how much differences in 
institutional form or design matter for trade, once we control for differences in overall 
institutional quality. The empirical estimations indicate that the impact of bad institutions – 
inefficient bureaucracy, corruption and poor property rights protection – is a much larger 
deterrent to trade than the impact of differences in form as proxied by differences in legal 
systems. This is particularly true in poor countries. We also found that the impacts of differences 
in legal origin and even in institutional effectiveness on trade are reduced when we include a 
whole set of controls in our model. Of particular note is the importance of our measure of 
infrastructure. Therefore, we argue that policies favoring harmonization may be much less 
important in promoting trade than policies promoting institutional effectiveness, especially since 
the latter are more likely to succeed and may be less costly to achieve. 
  Our indicator of institutional diversity is broad and picks up the effect of historical factors 
on trade, while failing to pick up how current legal systems of countries that share legal origins 
may vary. We argued that this indicator is not perfectly correlated with institutional quality. Rich 
countries have become rich with different legal systems, which promotes the view that form does 
not matter but functionality does. We hold the view that legal origin is a good indicator of legal 
system diversity especially as we control for overall institutional quality as well. 
 
 




Table 1: List of Variables and Sources 
      
Variable Availability  Description Source 
Log of average trade flow  1984-99  Average of real imports and exports between trade 
partners 
Rose (2004) 
Different Legal Origin  -  Indicator for different legal origins  Djankov et al. (2003) and 
CIA Factbook 
Bureaucratic Quality  1984-99  Sum of bureaucratic quality indicators per country pair  International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
Control of Corruption  1984-99  Sum of control of corruption indicators per country pair  International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
Protection of Property Rights  1995-99  Sum of property rights protection indicators per country 
pair 
The Heritage Foundation 
log distance  -  Great circle distance between trade pair  Rose (2004) 
log product of GDP  1984-99  log of product of trade pair real GDPs  Rose (2004) 
log product of land area  -  log product of trade pair land area  Rose (2004) 
no. of landlocked  -  Number of landlocked countries in trade pair (0, 1, 2)  Rose (2004) 
no. of islands  -  Number of island  countries in trade pair (0, 1, 2)  Rose (2004) 
common border  -  Indicator for a common border for trade pair  Rose (2004) 
common language  -  Indicator for a common official language for trade pair  Rose (2004) 
currency union  1984-99  Indicator for both countries in trade pair members in a 
currency union 
Rose (2004) 
common colonizer  -  Indicator for common colonizer of both countries in trade 
pair 
Rose (2004) 
colony-colonizer  -  Indicator for colony-colonizer relationship in trade pair  Rose (2004)    
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both in GATT/WTO  1984-99  Indicator for both countries in trade pair members in 
GATT/WTO 
Rose (2004) 
only one in GATT/WTO  1984-99  Indicator for only one country in trade pair a member in 
GATT/WTO 
Rose (2004) 
generalized system of 
preferences (GSP) 
1984-99  Indicator for one country extending GSP privileges to 
the other 
Rose (2004) 
regional trade agreement  1984-99  Indicator for both countries in trade pair members in a 
regional trade agreement 
Rose (2004) 
log of product of telephone lines 
per 1,000 people 
1984-99  log of product of telephone lines per 1,000 people in 
trade pair 
WDI, The World Bank 
log of product of road length per 
1,000 people 
1984-99  log of product of road length per 1,000 people in trade 
pair 
WDI, The World Bank 
average weighted tariff  1988-99  Average of bilateral weighted tariff for trade pair. When 
only one value exists, that is the one that is taken 
TRAINS, The World Bank 
sum of absolute latitude  -  Sum of absolute latitudes of countries in trade pair  CIA Factbook 
ethnic fractionalization  -  Sum of probabilities of two people randomly meeting 
someone not from their own ethnic group 
Alesina et al. (2003) 
Sources in detail:       
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Waicziarg (2003), "Fractionalization, Journal of 
Economic Growth 8 
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer (2003), "Courts", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
May 
Rose, Andrew (2004), "Do we really know that the WTO increases trade?", American Economic Review 94(1) 
CIA Factbook,http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/Factbook/ 
ICRG, http://www.icrgonline.com/       
The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/       
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
          
Variable Obs  Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
log of average trade flow  83757 10.41 3.47  -16.09  20.81 
Different legal origin  83757 0.66  0.48  0  1 
Sum of bureaucratic quality  77594 4.67  1.67  0  8 
Sum of control of corruption  77594 7.02  1.97  0  12 
Sum of property rights protection  29772 4.96  1.47  0  8 
log distance  83757 8.19  0.79  4.02  9.42 
log product of GDP  83757 48.87 2.48  39.00  59.09 
log product of land area  83757 24.69 2.83  11.82  32.77 
no. of landlocked  83757 0.27  0.48  0  2 
no. of islands  83757 0.26  0.47  0  2 
common border  83757 0.03  0.17  0  1 
common language  83757 0.19  0.39  0  1 
currency union  83757 0.01  0.08  0  1 
common colonizer  83757 0.09  0.28  0  1 
colony-colonizer 83757 0.02  0.13  0  1 
both in GATT/WTO  83757 0.64  0.48  0  1 
one in GATT/WTO  83757 0.32  0.47  0  1 
generalized system of preferences (GSP)  83757 0.31  0.46  0  1 
regional trade agreement  83757 0.02  0.13  0  1 
log of product of telephone lines per 1,000 people 80731 8.42  2.70  -0.30  14.37 
log of product of road length per 1,000 people  51286 3.03  1.55  -10.87  7.74 
average weighted tariff  36107 9.32  10.61  0  326.96
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Different legal origin 0.05
Sum of bureaucratic quality 0.48 0.20
Sum of control of corruption 0.36 0.20 0.68
Sum of property rights protection 0.41 0.15 0.70 0.47
common colonizer -0.11 -0.26 -0.12 -0.16 -0.09
colony-colinizer 0.14 -0.15 0.07 0.06 0.06 -0.04
both in GATT/WTO 0.11 0.02 0.25 0.20 0.27 0.03 0.04
generalized system of preferences (GSP) 0.29 0.16 0.33 0.37 0.33 -0.21 0.09 0.12
regional trade agreement 0.18 -0.05 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.05
log of product of telephone lines per 1,000 people 0.45 0.18 0.66 0.57 0.62 -0.22 0.05 0.09 0.26 0.13
log of product of road length per 1,000 people 0.14 0.12 0.48 0.49 0.34 -0.19 0.03 0.07 0.24 0.08 0.50
average weighted tariff -0.14 -0.05 -0.22 -0.25 -0.20 0.18 -0.05 0.02 -0.21 0.02 -0.28 -0.24
Table 3: Key Correlations
Notes: All correlations are taken for all existing observations. All correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level except for 
correl(regional,comcol), which is not statistically significant at conventional levels.     
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Table 4: Trade, Legal Origins and Bureaucratic Quality, Baseline 
Results 
      
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow     
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS IV OLS IV 
-0.10 -0.14 -0.24 -0.21  Different Legal Origin 
(-2.19) (-2.89) (-5.42) (-4.44) 
0.38 0.47 0.32 0.25  Bureaucratic Quality 
(26.2) (12.64)  (21.81)  (6.8) 
   -0.02  -0.02  average weighted tariff 
   (-12.91)  (-12.7) 
-1.09 -1.07 -0.97 -0.98  log distance 
(-36.97) (-35.44) (-33.55) (-32.82) 
1.07 1.03 1.01 1.03  log product of GDP 
(95.8) (63.24)  (96.78) (68.34) 
-0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.17  log product of land area 
(-21.75) (-18.06) (-19.12) (-17.91) 
-0.33 -0.35 -0.41 -0.40  no. of landlocked 
(-7.39) (-7.81) (-9.59) (-9.44) 
0.98 1.02 0.97 0.94  common border 
(6.77) (6.93) (6.49) (6.26) 
0.98 1.02 0.97 0.94  common border 
(6.77) (6.93) (6.49) (6.26) 
0.51 0.49 0.54 0.55  common language 
(9.07) (8.62) (9.97)  (10.06) 
1.90 1.86 1.18 1.19  currency union 
(7.85)  (7.66) (4.9) (4.98) 
Observations  77594 77594 32752 32752 
R^2  0.67 0.67 0.74 0.74 
First stage R^2    0.43    0.44 
88% 119% 70%  53%  % increase in trade due 
to 1s.d. institution             
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated 
taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant and year 
dummies are not reported. IV estimators use the sum of 
absolute latitude as an instrument for the sum of bureaucratic 
quality for both countries in a trading pair. The sum of 
bureaucratic quality ranges from 0 to 8 with mean 4.672 and 
standard deviation 1.667. The percent increase in trade due to 
1s.d. institution (bureaucratic quality) is calculated as follows: 
exp(coef*sd)-1. 
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Table 5: Trade, Legal Origins and Control of Corruption, 
Baseline Results 
        
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow     
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
-0.08 -0.09 -0.19 -0.18  Different Legal Origin 
(-1.70) (-1.78) (-4.13) (-3.83) 
0.27 0.28 0.17 0.15  Control of Corruption 
(25.11) (12.64) (15.80) (6.71) 
   -0.02  -0.02  average weighted tariff 
   (-13.12)  (-12.60) 
-1.08 -1.08 -0.97 -0.98  log distance 
(-37.03) (-36.23) (-32.82) (-31.90) 
1.13 1.12 1.08 1.09  log product of GDP 
(108.66) (96.35) (112.99) (106.44) 
-0.21 -0.21 -0.19 -0.19  log product of land 
area  (-23.48) (-22.33) (-22.14) (-21.69) 
-0.35 -0.35 -0.40 -0.40  no. of landlocked 
(-7.84) (-7.84) (-9.32) (-9.25) 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03  no. of islands 
(-0.55) (-0.64) (-0.83) (-0.72) 
0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92  common border 
(6.33) (6.33) (6.21) (6.10) 
0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63  common language 
(11.05) (11.06) (11.64) (11.64) 
2.15 2.15 1.37 1.36  currency union 
(8.59) (8.60) (5.66) (5.58) 
Observations 77594  77594  32752  32752 
R^2 0.67  0.67  0.73  0.73 
First stage R^2    0.40    0.43 
70% 74% 40% 36%  % increase in trade 
due to 1s.d. institution             
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated 
taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant and year 
dummies are not reported. IV estimators use the sum of 
absolute latitude as an instrument for the sum of control of 
corruption for both countries in a trading pair. The sum of control 
of corruption ranges from 0 to 12 with mean 7.012 and standard 
deviation 1.972. The percent increase in trade due to 1s.d. 
institution (control of corruption) is calculated as follows: 
exp(coef*sd)-1. 
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Table 6: Trade, Legal Origins and Protection of Property Rights, 
Baseline Results 
       
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow     
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS IV OLS IV 
-0.25 -0.26 -0.29 -0.25  Different Legal Origin 
(-5.96) (-5.76) (-6.76) (-5.38) 
0.31 0.36 0.30 0.18  Protection of Property 
Rights  (21.43) (6.34) (19.71) (3.40) 
   -0.02  -0.02  average weighted tariff 
   (-8.64)  (-8.52) 
-1.20 -1.20 -1.15 -1.14  log distance 
(-48.76) (-48.47) (-45.06) (-44.00) 
0.98 0.97 0.99 1.02  log product of GDP 
(105.61) (49.36) (102.26) (59.68) 
-0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13  log product of land 
area  (-12.20) (-6.45) (-12.08) (-9.76) 
-0.54 -0.55 -0.55 -0.53  no. of landlocked 
(-15.70) (-15.35) (-15.17) (-14.15) 
-0.18 -0.20 -0.18 -0.12  no. of islands 
(-4.15) (-3.98) (-4.15) (-2.42) 
1.04 1.05 0.96 0.95  common border 
(8.38) (8.36) (7.59) (7.46) 
0.41 0.38 0.52 0.59  common language 
(7.72) (6.26) (9.94) (9.78) 
1.31 1.32 1.06 1.09  currency union 
(5.46) (5.47) (2.93) (3.15) 
Observations  29772 29772 19536 19536 
R^2  0.72 0.72 0.75 0.75 
First  stage  R^2   0.42  0.42 
57% 69% 55% 30%  % increase in trade 
due to 1s.d. institution             
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated 
taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant and year 
dummies are not reported. IV estimators use the sum of 
absolute latitude as an instrument for the sum of protection of 
property rights for both countries in a trading pair. The sum of 
protection of property rights ranges from 0 to 8 with mean 4.962 
and standard deviation 1.47. The percent increase in trade due 
to 1s.d. institution (property rights) is calculated as follows: 
exp(coef*sd)-1. 
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Table 7a: Trade, Legal Origins and Institutional Quality, Relative Explanatory Power 
          
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow 
          
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 A.  1995-99  1984-99  1984-99  1984-99  1995-99 
-0.14 -0.13 -0.1 -0.08 -0.25  Different Legal Origin 
[3.02] [2.76]  [2.19]  [1.70] [5.96] 
0.16 0.26  0.38      Bureaucratic Quality 
[7.76] [14.90]  [26.20]     
0.06 0.14    0.27    Control of Corruption 
[4.81] [11.22]    [25.11]   
0.2       0.31  Protection of Property Rights 
[11.07]      [21.43] 
Observations 23609  77594  77594  77594  29772 
R^2 0.74  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.72 
          
 B.  Beta Coefficients 
Different Legal Origin  -0.020  -0.018  -0.014  -0.011  -0.035 
Bureaucratic Quality  0.071  0.126  0.182     
Control of Corruption  0.032  0.082    0.154   
Protection of Property Rights  0.091        0.137 
                 
Notes: Panel A reports OLS estimates. t-values in brackets. Standard errors are calculated 
taking into account country-pair clusters. The following variables are included in the 
estimation but their coefficients are not reported: log distance, log product of GDP, log 
product of land area, no. of landlocked, common border, common border, common language, 
currency union. A constant and year dummies are not reported as well. Panel B reports beta 
coefficients estimated for the same specification as panel A. 
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Table 7b: Trade, Legal Origins and Institutional Quality, Relative Explanatory Power, 
Average Trade Partner 
         
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow with average trade partner 
       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A.  1995-99 1984-99 1984-99 1984-99 1995-99 
-0.64 -0.36 -0.36  -0.2  -1.23  Different-ness in Legal Origin 
[3.43] [3.28] [3.26] [1.78] [7.12] 
0.33 0.33 0.34      Bureaucratic Quality 
[5.61] [12.21]  [16.02]    
-0.05  0.01  0.17   Control of Corruption 
[1.25] [0.39]    [9.95]   
0.22      0.36  Protection of Property Rights 
[3.97]      [8.28] 
Observations  539  1790 1790 1790  638 
R^2  0.82 0.79 0.79 0.77  0.8 
       
B. Beta  Coefficients 
Different Legal Origin  -0.079  -0.042  -0.041  -0.023  -0.166 
Bureaucratic Quality  0.185  0.223  0.228     
Control of Corruption  -0.032  0.006    0.133   
Protection of Property Rights  0.124        0.197 
                 
Notes: All variables are averages per reporting country vis-à-vis its trading partners. Panel A 
reports OLS estimates. t-values in brackets. The following variables are included in the 
estimation but their coefficients are not reported: log distance, log product of GDP, log 
product of land area, no. of landlocked, common border, common border, common language, 
currency union. A constant and year dummies are not reported as well. Panel B reports beta 
coefficients estimated for the same specification as panel A. 
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Table 8: Trade, Legal Origins and Bureaucratic Quality, 5-year averages 
          
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow           
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Years in Average          1985-1989              1990-1994              1995-1999     
-0.04 -0.20 -0.11 -0.19 -0.15 -0.19  Different Legal Origin 
(-0.50) (-2.33) (-1.72) (-2.78) (-3.10) (-3.51) 
0.45 0.81 0.43 0.58 0.32 0.44  Bureaucratic Quality 
(20.65) (13.55) (20.30) (11.78) (14.82)  (7.49) 
-1.25 -1.20 -1.12 -1.09 -1.12 -1.10  log distance 
(-27.42) (-24.82) (-29.94) (-27.33) (-38.88) (-37.26) 
1.16 1.02 1.16 1.11 1.05 1.00  log product of GDP 
(62.27) (37.21) (73.58) (50.92) (78.48) (42.41) 
-0.27 -0.22 -0.24 -0.23 -0.13 -0.11  log product of land area 
(-20.06) (-15.27) (-20.89) (-17.43) (-13.36)  (-7.30) 
-0.08 -0.16 -0.29 -0.31 -0.41 -0.43  no. of landlocked 
(-1.01) (-1.97) (-4.97) (-5.31) (-9.22) (-9.70) 
-0.05 -0.36 -0.14 -0.22 -0.21 -0.28  no. of islands 
(-0.76) (-4.32) (-2.32) (-3.40) (-4.28) (-4.96) 
0.91 1.08 1.12 1.21 1.22 1.26  common border 
(4.76) (5.21) (6.52) (6.83) (7.70) (7.75) 
0.46 0.35 0.52 0.48 0.53 0.51  common language 
(5.34) (3.91) (7.18) (6.59) (8.73) (8.12) 
1.96 1.54 2.23 2.18 1.69 1.72  currency union 
(6.83) (4.98) (8.25) (7.98) (6.03) (6.11) 
Observations  5353 5353 5627 5627 7014 7014 
R^2  0.62 0.61 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.74 
First stage R^2    0.38    0.44    0.52 
121%  318% 99% 154% 58%  88%  % increase in trade due to 
1s.d. institution                   
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated taking into account 
country-pair clusters. A constant is not reported. Each column reports a regression 
performed on one cross-section of 5-year averages. The averages are taken over all 
available years in the 5-year sub-sample, and the procedure takes into account missing 
year observations. IV estimators use the sum of absolute latitude as an instrument for the 
sum of bureaucratic quality for both countries in a trading pair. The sum of bureaucratic 
quality ranges from 0 to 8 with means 4.21, 4.58, 4.85, with standard deviations 1.77, 
1.62, 1.42, in years 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, respectively. The percent increase in 
trade due to 1s.d. institution (property rights) is calculated as follows: exp(coef*sd)-1. 
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Table 9: Trade, Legal Origins and Control of corruption, 5-year averages 
           
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow           
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Years in Average          1985-1989              1990-1994              1995-1999     
-0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.15  Different Legal Origin 
(-0.12) (-1.13) (-1.25) (-1.29) (-2.17) (-2.83) 
0.33 0.50 0.35 0.35  0.15 0.26  Control of Corruption 
(19.47) (13.97) (19.59) (11.93) (11.25)  (7.43) 
-1.25 -1.22 -1.13 -1.13  -1.12 -1.10  log distance 
(-27.43) (-25.78) (-30.32) (-29.47) (-38.63) (-36.39) 
1.21 1.14 1.20 1.20 1.13 1.11  log product of GDP 
(66.47) (53.91) (82.16) (73.21) (104.23) (88.84) 
-0.27 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25  -0.18 -0.16  log product of land area 
(-20.37) (-18.02) (-21.07) (-20.20) (-18.97) (-15.47) 
-0.14 -0.22 -0.42 -0.42  -0.36 -0.38  no. of landlocked 
(-1.79) (-2.72) (-7.20) (-7.16) (-8.24) (-8.73) 
0.22 0.17 -0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.22  no. of islands 
(3.26) (2.50) (-0.99)  (-1.02) (-2.94) (-4.09) 
0.81 0.86 1.02 1.03  1.16 1.21  common border 
(4.29) (4.45) (6.01) (5.99) (7.41) (7.56) 
0.63 0.65 0.65 0.65  0.61 0.62  common language 
(7.29) (7.41) (9.11) (9.10) (9.94)  (10.11) 
2.42 2.39 2.47 2.47 1.73 1.83  currency union 
(8.11) (7.84) (8.56) (8.56) (6.05) (6.27) 
Observations  5353 5353 5627 5627 7014 7014 
R^2  0.62 0.61 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.73 
First stage R^2    0.37    0.47    0.34 
101%  182%  89% 92% 29% 54%  % increase in trade due to 
1s.d. institution                   
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated taking into account 
country-pair clusters. A constant is not reported. Each column reports a regression 
performed on one cross-section of 5-year averages. The averages are taken over all 
available years in the 5-year sub-sample, and the procedure takes into account missing 
year observations. IV estimators use the sum of absolute latitude as an instrument for the 
sum of control of corruption for both countries in a trading pair. The sum of control of 
corruption ranges from 0 to 12 with means 6.65, 7.19, 6.79, with standard deviations 
2.09, 1.84, 1.66, in years 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, respectively. The percent increase 
in trade due to 1s.d. institution (property rights) is calculated as follows: exp(coef*sd)-1. 
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Table 10: Trade, Legal Origins and Property Rights, 5-year averages 
           
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow         
           
  (1)  (2)       
    OLS  IV       
Years in Average          1995-1999         
-0.30 -0.39      Different Legal Origin 
(-6.42) (-7.27)       
0.29  0.58        Protection of Property 
Rights  (16.20) (8.29)      
-1.27  -1.30        log distance 
(-45.90) (-44.91)      
1.04  0.94        log product of GDP 
(92.83) (37.87)      
-0.11  -0.05        log product of land area 
(-12.24) (-2.84)      
-0.43  -0.49        no. of landlocked 
(-10.72) (-11.70)      
-0.22  -0.38        no. of islands 
(-4.67) (-6.40)       
1.14  1.18        common border 
(7.81) (7.79)       
0.34  0.18        common language 
(5.86) (2.54)       
1.32  1.42        currency union 
(5.38) (5.50)       
Observations 8632  8632         
R^2 0.72  0.71         
First stage R^2    0.43         
54% 139%          % increase in trade due 
to 1s.d. institution               
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated taking into account 
country-pair clusters. A constant is not reported. Each column reports a regression 
performed on one cross-section of 5-year averages. The averages are taken over all 
available years in the 5-year sub-sample, and the procedure takes into account missing 
year observations. IV estimators use the sum of absolute latitude as an instrument for the 
sum of property rights for both countries in a trading pair. The sum of property rights 
ranges from 0 to 12 with mean 4.8 and standard deviation 1.5, in 1995-99. The percent 
increase in trade due to 1s.d. institution (property rights) is calculated as follows: 
exp(coef*sd)-1.    
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Table 11: Trade, Legal Origins and Bureaucratic Quality, Robustness 
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
-0.10 -0.07 -0.14 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.17  Different Legal Origin 
(-2.19) (-1.45) (-3.13) (-1.74) (-2.21) (-1.06) (-3.92) 
0.38 0.37 0.33 0.21 0.27 0.17 0.18  Bureaucratic Quality 
(26.20) (25.95) (22.45) (13.08) (15.43) (10.41) (11.47) 
-1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.03 -1.09 -0.96  log distance 
(-36.97) (-37.00) (-36.57) (-37.57) (-34.45) (-37.16) (-34.06) 
1.07 1.06 1.05 0.98 1.09 0.97 0.96  log product of GDP 
(95.80) (94.34) (93.16) (87.18)  (93.3) (85.01)  (88.36) 
-0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.11 -0.21 -0.10 -0.11  log product of land area 
(-21.75) (-21.30) (-21.20) (-11.28)  (-20.79) (-9.98) (-11.64) 
-0.33 -0.33 -0.34 -0.29 -0.40 -0.32 -0.36  no. of landlocked 
(-7.39) (-7.43) (-7.92) (-6.54) (-9.18) (-7.40) (-8.70) 
-0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.18 -0.22 -0.17 -0.11  no. of islands 
(-3.43) (-3.17) (-2.77) (-4.03) (-4.60) (-3.83) (-2.63) 
0.98 0.97 1.05 0.97 1.05 1.02 0.75  common border 
(6.77) (6.58) (7.40) (6.84) (7.31) (7.21) (5.35) 
0.51 0.46 0.53 0.59 0.61 0.47 0.44  common language 
(9.07) (7.94) (9.49)  (10.75) (10.35)  (8.46)  (8.74) 
1.90 1.96 1.92 2.38 2.11 2.12 1.36  currency union 
(7.85) (7.83) (7.91) (9.51) (8.78) (8.29) (4.78) 
  -0.01      0.45  0.33  common colonizer 
  (-0.14)      (4.54)  (2.69) 
  0.96      0.90  0.85  colony-colonizer 
  (6.90)      (6.59)  (6.98) 
   -0.25     -0.03  -0.13  both in GATT/WTO 
   (-2.32)     (-0.25)  (-0.75) 
   -0.16     -0.06  -0.12  only one in GATT/WTO 
   (-1.49)     (-0.56)  (-0.67) 
   0.64     0.54  0.26  generalized system of 
preferences (GSP)     (16.25)    (14.09)  (6.87) 
   0.53     0.36  1.77  regional trade agreement 
   (3.60)     (2.47)  (10.28) 
    0.23    0.22  0.16  log of product of phone 
lines per 1,000 people       (18.37)  (17.64)  (13.17) 
     0.11     log of product of road 
length per 1,000 people       ( 7 . 3 1 )     
       - 0 . 0 1   average weighted tariff 
       ( - 9 . 6 2 )  
Observations  77594 77594 77594 74576 46074 74576 32466 
R^2  0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.69 0.76 
88% 87% 74% 41% 57% 32% 36%  % increase in trade due to 
1s.d. institution                      
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant, year and 
country dummies are not reported. The sum of bureaucratic quality ranges from 0 to 8 with mean 4.672 and standard 
deviation 1.667. The percent increase in trade due to 1s.d. institution (bureaucratic quality) is calculated as follows: 
exp(coef*sd)-1.    
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Table 12: Trade, Legal Origins and Control of Corruption, Robustness 
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
-0.08 -0.04  -0.12 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.13  Different Legal Origin 
(-1.70) (-0.88)  (-2.49) (-1.33) (-1.90) (-0.52) (-2.80) 
0.27 0.27  0.23 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.05  Control of Corruption 
(25.11) (24.73)  (20.24) (10.88) (14.12) (7.16) (4.25) 
-1.08 -1.08  -1.09 -1.09 -1.02 -1.10 -0.97  log distance 
(-37.03) (-37.10)  (-36.56) (-37.56) (-34.36) (-37.20) (-33.97) 
1.13 1.12  1.10 1.02 1.14 0.99 0.98  log product of GDP 
(108.66) (106.79)  (102.99)  (91.43) (111.02) (87.10) (91.33) 
-0.21 -0.21  -0.21 -0.12 -0.23 -0.10 -0.11  log product of land area 
(-23.48) (-22.90)  (-22.78) (-11.77) (-23.27)  (-9.90) (-11.37) 
-0.35 -0.35  -0.36 -0.29 -0.40 -0.31 -0.34  no. of landlocked 
(-7.84) (-7.90)  (-8.19) (-6.56) (-9.29) (-7.32) (-8.30) 
-0.03 -0.02  -0.01 -0.11 -0.17 -0.11 -0.07  no. of islands 
(-0.55) (-0.42)  (-0.18) (-2.40) (-3.46) (-2.57) (-1.71) 
0.91 0.90  0.98 0.93 1.01 0.98 0.70  common border 
(6.33) (6.17)  (6.91) (6.59) (7.08) (6.98) (5.00) 
0.62 0.56  0.62 0.65 0.69 0.50 0.49  common language 
(11.05) (9.62)  (11.16) (11.90) (11.76) (9.14) (9.65) 
2.15 2.16  2.12 2.54 2.24 2.22 1.43  currency union 
(8.59) (8.36)  (8.44) (10.04) (9.17)  (8.57) (4.83) 
 0.06       0.50  0.40  common colonizer 
 (0.64)       (5.04)  (3.30) 
 0.92       0.91  0.86  colony-colonizer 
 (6.51)       (6.54)  (6.88) 
   -0.17     0.05  -0.02  both in GATT/WTO 
   (-1.51)     (0.47)  (-0.10) 
   -0.11     -0.01  -0.05  only one in GATT/WTO 
   (-0.97)     (-0.13)  (-0.31) 
   0.61     0.54  0.29  generalized system of 
preferences (GSP)     (15.27)    (13.94)  (7.65) 
   0.47     0.34  1.73  regional trade agreement 
   (3.23)     (2.37)  (10.08) 
     0.24  0.24  0.21  log of product of phone 
lines per 1,000 people       (19.02)  (19.03)  (16.94) 
      0.13     log of product of road 
length per 1,000 people        (8.60)    
       -0.01  average weighted tariff 
       (-9.73) 
Observations  77594 77594 77594 74576 46074 74576 32466 
R^2 0.67  0.67  0.67  0.68 0.71 0.69 0.75 
70% 69% 56% 29% 40% 18% 10%  % increase in trade due to 
1s.d. institution                      
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant, year and 
country dummies are not reported. The sum of control of corruption ranges from 0 to 12 with mean 7.012 and standard 
deviation 1.972. The percent increase in trade due to 1s.d. institution (control of corruption) is calculated as follows: 
exp(coef*sd)-1.    
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Table 13: Trade, Legal Origins and Property Rights, Robustness 
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
-0.25 -0.17  -0.25 -0.26 -0.28 -0.16 -0.21  Different Legal Origin 
(-5.96) (-4.03)  (-6.00) (-6.29) (-6.44) (-3.77) (-4.97) 
0.31 0.31  0.28 0.18 0.26 0.13 0.17  Protection of Property 
Rights  (21.43) (21.73)  (18.89) (11.61) (17.08) (8.02) (10.04) 
-1.20 -1.19  -1.16 -1.16 -1.18 -1.13 -1.10  log distance 
(-48.76) (-48.58)  (-46.33) (-46.91) (46.66) (-45.08) (-43.21) 
0.98 0.98  0.97 0.92 0.99 0.90 0.94  log product of GDP 
(105.61) (105.17)  (102.82)  (94.34) (103.19) (91.33) (94.96) 
-0.10 -0.09  -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.03 -0.06  log product of land area 
(-12.20) (-11.47)  (-12.80)  (-5.04) (-12.05) (-3.77) (-6.93) 
-0.54 -0.55  -0.54 -0.48 -0.50 -0.47 -0.48  no. of landlocked 
(-15.70) (-16.00)  (-15.73) (-13.80) (-14.05) (-13.83) (-13.28) 
-0.18 -0.19  -0.19 -0.16 -0.19 -0.19 -0.22  no. of islands 
(-4.15) (-4.45)  (-4.63) (-3.75) (-4.17) (-4.62) (-5.37) 
1.04 1.01  1.02 1.07 1.03 1.00 0.73  common border 
(8.38) (8.04)  (8.31) (8.76) (8.03) (8.22) (5.60) 
0.41 0.27  0.41 0.56 0.42 0.37 0.41  common language 
(7.72) (4.97)  (7.91) (10.60) (7.49)  (7.05) (8.10) 
1.31 1.12  1.39 1.71 1.35 1.38 1.16  currency union 
(5.46) (4.53)  (5.77) (7.13) (5.61) (5.70) (3.15) 
 0.46       0.70  0.52  common colonizer 
 (5.07)       (8.00)  (4.66) 
 1.10       0.98  0.95  colony-colonizer 
 (8.53)       (8.02)  (8.31) 
   -0.62     -0.13  -0.29  both in GATT/WTO 
   (-5.05)     (-1.16)  (-1.84) 
   -0.63     -0.30  -0.44  only one in GATT/WTO 
   (-5.11)     (-2.59)  (-2.78) 
   0.42     0.39  0.21  generalized system of 
preferences (GSP)     (11.69)    (11.20)  (5.94) 
   0.66     0.58  1.73  regional trade agreement 
   (5.34)     (4.88)  (9.83) 
     0.18    0.19  0.15  log of product of phone 
lines per 1,000 people       (15.44)    (16.44)  (11.63) 
      0.04     log of product of road 
length per 1,000 people        (3.91)    
       -0.01  average weighted tariff 
       (-7.44) 
Observations  29772 29772 29772 29696 26129 29696 19488 
R^2 0.72  0.72  0.72  0.72 0.72 0.73 0.76 
57% 58% 51% 30% 47% 22% 29%  % increase in trade due to 
1s.d. institution                      
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant, year and 
country dummies are not reported. The sum of bureaucratic quality ranges from 0 to 8 with mean 4.672 and standard 
deviation 1.667. The percent increase in trade due to 1s.d. institution (bureaucratic quality) is calculated as follows: 




Table 14: Trade, Legal Origins and Bureaucratic Quality, Rich Countries vs. Poor   
         
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow           
          
            All                Rich Partner         Poor Partner     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
    OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV   
-0.1 -0.14  -0.28 -0.2 -0.12  -0.19    Different Legal Origin 
[2.19] [2.89] [5.27] [3.44] [2.43] [3.43]   
0.38 0.47 0.32 0.12 0.38 0.52    Bureaucratic Quality 
[26.20] [12.64] [17.90] [2.21] [24.12] [11.09]   
-1.09 -1.07 -0.81 -0.85 -1.14 -1.14    log distance 
[36.97] [35.44] [24.97] [24.52] [33.34] [32.94]   
1.07 1.03 1.06 1.11 1.08 1.04    log product of GDP 
[95.80] [63.25] [79.65] [62.34] [89.92] [56.13]   
-0.2 -0.18  -0.18  -0.18 -0.2 -0.18    log product of land area 
[21.75] [18.07] [16.62] [16.49] [20.43] [15.69]   
-0.33 -0.35 -0.28 -0.25  -0.3  -0.33    no. of landlocked 
[7.39] [7.82] [5.99] [5.44] [6.40] [6.93]   
-0.16 -0.21 -0.29 -0.16 -0.24 -0.31    common border 
[3.43] [4.27] [5.63] [2.68] [4.83] [5.69]   
0.98 1.02 0.09 0.17 1.17 1.24    common border 
[6.77] [6.93] [0.59] [1.00] [7.44] [7.74]   
0.51 0.49 0.38 0.44 0.52 0.48    common language 
[9.07] [8.62] [6.13] [6.90] [8.35] [7.52]   
1.9 1.86  1.11  0.98 1.81 1.74    currency union 
[7.85] [7.66] [6.17] [9.69] [7.51] [7.15]   
Observations  77594 77594 39961 39961 69014 69014   
R^2 0.67  0.67  0.78  0.77 0.64 0.64   
First  stage  R^2   0.43  0.38  0.37   
88% 119% 52%  17%  84% 130%    % increase in trade due to 
1s.d. institution 
                   
Notes: t-values in Brackets. Standard errors are calculated taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant and year 
dummies are not reported. IV estimators use the sum of absolute latitude as an instrument for Bureaucratic Quality. The 
Rich Partner subsample includes all country pairs where at least one is "rich". The Poor Partner subsample includes all 
country pairs where at least one is "poor". "Rich" countries are defined as those with PPP GDP per capita larger than 
10,000 dollars in 2000 and the rest are "poor". The percent increase in trade due to 1s.d. institution is calculated as 
exp(coef*sd)-1 and takes into account different standard deviations in each subsample. Summary statistics for the 
institutional quality variable in each subsample are reported in Table 16. 
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Table 15: Trade, Legal Origins and Corruption, Rich Countries vs. Poor   
          
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow   
           
            All                Rich Partner         Poor Partner     
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
    OLS  IV OLS IV OLS IV   
-0.08  -0.09 -0.25 -0.19  -0.1  -0.11    Different Legal Origin 
[1.70]  [1.78] [4.42] [3.33] [2.01] [2.08]   
0.27  0.28 0.17 0.07 0.29  0.3    Control of Corruption 
[25.11] [12.65]  [11.89] [2.19] [23.52] [11.17]   
-1.08  -1.08 -0.83 -0.85 -1.14 -1.14    log distance 
[37.03] [36.24]  [24.99] [24.68] [33.24] [33.25]   
1.13  1.12 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.14    log product of GDP 
[108.66] [96.37] [91.33] [87.20] [99.52] [91.34]   
-0.21  -0.21 -0.19 -0.19 -0.22 -0.21    log product of land area 
[23.48] [22.34]  [17.79] [17.38] [21.76] [20.44]   
-0.35  -0.35 -0.27 -0.25 -0.32 -0.33    no. of landlocked 
[7.84]  [7.84] [5.76] [5.37] [6.84] [6.85]   
-0.03  -0.03 -0.13 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14    common border 
[0.55]  [0.64] [2.55] [2.04] [2.59] [2.64]   
0.91  0.91 0.12 0.17 1.09  1.1    common border 
[6.33]  [6.33] [0.76] [1.02] [6.93] [6.93]   
0.62  0.62 0.49 0.48 0.63 0.63    common language 
[11.05] [11.06] [7.93] [7.73] [10.10] [10.11]   
2.15 2.15 1.2 1.03 2.09  2.1    currency union 
[8.59] [8.60]  [11.54]  [9.00] [8.33] [8.33]   
Observations  77594  77594 39961 39961 69014 69014   
R^2 0.67  0.67  0.77  0.77 0.64 0.64   
First stage R^2    0.40    0.32    0.35   
70%  74% 34% 13% 71% 74%    % increase in trade due to 
1s.d. institution 
                   
Notes: t-values in Brackets. Standard errors are calculated taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant and year 
dummies are not reported. IV estimators use the sum of absolute latitude as an instrument for Control of Corruption. The 
Rich Partner subsample includes all country pairs where at least one is "rich". The Poor Partner subsample includes all 
country pairs where at least one is "poor". "Rich" countries are defined as those with PPP GDP per capita larger than 
10,000 dollars in 2000 and the rest are "poor". The percent increase in trade due to 1s.d. institution is calculated as 
exp(coef*sd)-1 and takes into account different standard deviations in each subsample. Summary statistics for the 
institutional quality variable in each subsample are reported in Table 16. 
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Table 16: Trade, Legal Origins and Property Rights, Rich Countries vs. Poor   
          
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow   
           
            All                Rich Partner         Poor Partner     
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
    OLS  IV OLS IV OLS IV   
-0.25  -0.26 -0.27 -0.16 -0.28 -0.31    Different Legal Origin 
[5.96]  [5.76] [5.55] [2.90] [6.34] [6.23]   
0.31 0.36 0.3 -0.1  0.32  0.41    Protection of Property 
Rights  [21.43] [6.35]  [15.83]  [1.52] [20.33] [6.05]   
-1.2  -1.2  -0.99 -0.96 -1.25 -1.27    log distance 
[48.76] [48.48]  [35.11] [31.77] [45.62] [43.92]   
0.98  0.97 1.01 1.11 0.99 0.97    log product of GDP 
[105.61] [49.37] [88.91] [58.67] [98.69] [44.96]   
-0.1  -0.09 -0.1 -0.15 -0.1 -0.08    log product of land area 
[12.20] [6.45]  [10.83] [11.96] [11.34] [5.06]   
-0.54  -0.55 -0.61 -0.54 -0.53 -0.55    no. of landlocked 
[15.70] [15.35]  [15.54] [13.04] [14.84] [14.54]   
-0.18  -0.2  -0.2  -0.07 -0.27 -0.31    common border 
[4.15]  [3.98] [4.23] [1.18] [5.69] [5.55]   
1.04 1.05  -0.03  0.19 1.22 1.23    common border 
[8.38]  [8.37] [0.15] [0.96] [9.44] [9.46]   
0.41  0.38 0.41 0.62 0.4 0.35    common language 
[7.72]  [6.26] [6.82] [8.48] [7.00] [5.12]   
1.31 1.32  0.31 0.6 1.21  1.23    currency union 
[5.46]  [5.48] [0.68] [2.33] [5.05] [5.07]   
Observations  29772  29772 14160 14160 26948 26948   
R^2 0.72  0.72  0.81  0.79 0.69 0.69   
First stage R^2    0.42    0.30    0.38   
58%  70% 42% -11% 57% 79%    % increase in trade due to 
1s.d. institution 
                   
Notes: t-values in Brackets. Standard errors are calculated taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant and year 
dummies are not reported. IV estimators use the sum of absolute latitude as an instrument for Protection of Property 
Rights. The Rich Partner subsample includes all country pairs where at least one is "rich". The Poor Partner subsample 
includes all country pairs where at least one is "poor". "Rich" countries are defined as those with PPP GDP per capita 
larger than 10,000 dollars in 2000 and the rest are "poor". The percent increase in trade due to 1s.d. institution is 
calculated as exp(coef*sd)-1 and takes into account different standard deviations in each subsample. Summary statistics 
for the institutional quality variable in each subsample are reported in Table 16. 
     
  52
 
Table 17: Summary Statistics for Rich\Poor Subsamples 
          
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
          
Rich Partner subsample: at least one country with PPP GDP per capita >10,000 in 2000 
Sum of bureaucratic quality  39961  5.60  1.32  1  8 
Sum of control of corruption 39961  8.11  1.70  0  12 
Sum of property rights protection 14160  5.82  1.16  2  8 
          
Poor Partner subsample: at least one country with PPP GDP per capita <10,000 in 2000 
Sum of bureaucratic quality  69014  4.51  1.60  0  8 
Sum of control of corruption 69014  6.87  1.85  0  12 
Sum of property rights protection 26948  4.83  1.42  0  8 





ICRG countries sample (Bureaucratic Quality, Control of Corruption) 
 
ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGOLA, ARGENTINA, ARMENIA, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, 
AZERBAIJAN, BAHAMAS, BAHRAIN, BANGLADESH, BELARUS, BELGIUM, BOLIVIA, 
BOTSWANA, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, BURKINA FASO, BURMA(Myanmar) , CAMEROON, 
CANADA, CHILE, CHINA, COLOMBIA, CONGO, DEM. REP. OF (ZAIRE) , CONGO, REP. 
OF, COSTA RICA, COTE D'IVORIE (IVORY COAST) , CROATIA, CYPRUS, CZECH 
REPUBLIC, DENMARK, DOMINICAN REP. , ECUADOR, EGYPT, EL SALVADOR, 
ESTONIA, ETHIOPIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, GABON, GAMBIA, GERMANY, GHANA, 
GREECE, GUATEMALA, GUINEA, GUINEA-BISSAU, GUYANA, HAITI, HONDURAS, 
HONG KONG, HUNGARY, ICELAND, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ, IRELAND, 
ISRAEL, ITALY, JAMAICA, JAPAN, JORDAN, KAZAKHSTAN, KENYA, 
KOREA,SOUTH(R) , KUWAIT, LATVIA, LEBANON, LIBERIA, LIBYA, LITHUANIA, 
LUXEMBOURG, MADAGASCAR, MALAWI, MALAYSIA, MALI, MALTA, MEXICO, 
MOLDVA, MONGOLIA, MOROCCO, MOZAMBIQUE, NAMIBIA, NETHERLANDS, NEW 
ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, NIGER, NIGERIA, NORWAY, OMAN, PAKISTAN, PANAMA, 
PAPUA N.GUINEA, PARAGUAY, PERU, PHILIPPINES, POLAND, PORTUGAL, QATAR, 
ROMANIA, RUSSIA, SAUDI ARABIA, SENEGAL, SIERRA LEONE, SINGAPORE, 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC, SLOVENIA, SOMALIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN, SRI LANKA, 
SUDAN, SURINAME, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, SYRIA, TANZANIA, THAILAND, 
TOGO, TRINIDAD&TOBAGO, TUNISIA, TURKEY, UGANDA, UKRAINE, UNITED 
ARAB EMIRATES, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, URUGUAY, VENEZUELA, 
VIETNAM, YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE.    
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Heritage Foundation countries sample (Property Rights) 
 
ALBANIA, ALGERIA, ANGOLA, ARGENTINA, ARMENIA, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, 
AZERBAIJAN, BAHAMAS, BAHRAIN, BANGLADESH, BARBADOS, BELARUS, 
BELGIUM, BELIZE, BENIN, BOLIVIA, BOTSWANA, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, BURKINA 
FASO, BURMA(Myanmar) , BURUNDI, CAMBODIA, CAMEROON, CANADA, CAPE 
VERDE, CHAD, CHILE, CHINA, COLOMBIA, CONGO, DEM. REP. OF (ZAIRE) , CONGO, 
REP. OF, COSTA RICA, COTE D'IVORIE (IVORY COAST) , CROATIA, CYPRUS, CZECH 
REPUBLIC, DENMARK, DJIBOUTI, DOMINICAN REP. , ECUADOR, EGYPT, EL 
SALVADOR, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, ESTONIA, ETHIOPIA, FIJI, FINLAND, FRANCE, 
GABON, GAMBIA, GEORGIA, GERMANY, GHANA, GREECE, GUATEMALA, GUINEA, 
GUINEA-BISSAU, GUYANA, HAITI, HONDURAS, HONG KONG, HUNGARY, ICELAND, 
INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRELAND, ISRAEL, ITALY, JAMAICA, JAPAN, JORDAN, 
KAZAKHSTAN, KENYA, KOREA, SOUTH(R), KUWAIT, KYRQYZ REPUBLIC, LAO 
PEOPLE'S DEM. REP. , LATVIA, LEBANON, LESOTHO, LIBYA, LITHUANIA, 
LUXEMBOURG, MADAGASCAR, MALAWI, MALAYSIA, MALI, MALTA, 
MAURITANIA, MAURITIUS, MEXICO, MOLDVA, MONGOLIA, MOROCCO, 
MOZAMBIQUE, NAMIBIA, NEPAL, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, 
NIGER, NIGERIA, NORWAY, OMAN, PAKISTAN, PANAMA, PAPUA N.GUINEA, 
PARAGUAY, PERU, PHILIPPINES, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, RUSSIA, 
RWANDA, SAMOA, SAUDI ARABIA, SENEGAL, SIERRA LEONE, SINGAPORE, 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC, SLOVENIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN, SRI LANKA, SUDAN, 
SURINAME, SWAZILAND, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, SYRIA, TAJIKISTAN, 
TANZANIA, THAILAND, TOGO, TRINIDAD&TOBAGO, TUNISIA, TURKEY, 
TURKMENISTAN, UGANDA, UKRAINE, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, UNITED 
KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, URUGUAY, UZBEKISTAN, VENEZUELA, VIETNAM, 
YEMEN, , REPUBLIC OF, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE 
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List of 31 countries with PPP GDP per capita >10,000 in 2000 
 
AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, CANADA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, 
GERMANY, HONG KONG, ICELAND, IRELAND, JAPAN, LUXEMBOURG, 
NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, SINGAPORE, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, BAHAMAS, ISRAEL, ITALY, 
KUWAIT, CYPRUS, GREECE, KOREA,SOUTH(R) , PORTUGAL, SPAIN, NEW ZEALAND 
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Table A1: Trade and Legal Origins 
    
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow 
    
 (1)  (2) 
   OLS  OLS 
0.015 -0.14  Different Legal Origin 
(0.31) (-3.34) 
 -0.03  average weighted 
tariff   (-16.12) 
-1.18 -1.08  log distance 
(-41.88) (-39.49) 
1.19 1.11  log product of GDP 
(122.29) (126.77) 
-0.24 -0.20  log product of land 
area  (-27.34) (-24.69) 
-0.28 -0.41  no. of landlocked 
(-6.64) (-10.63) 
0.07 0.01  common border 
(1.54) (0.28) 
0.81 0.82  common border 
(5.90) (6.00) 
0.56 0.62  common language 
(9.84) (11.66) 
1.92 1.14  currency union 
(8.24) (4.97) 
Observations 83757  36107 
R^2 0.65  0.72 
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard 
errors are calculated taking into account 
country-pair clusters. A constant and year 
dummies are not reported. 
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Table A2: Trade and Bureaucratic Quality 
      
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow     
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    OLS IV OLS IV 
0.37 0.45 0.30 0.23  Bureaucratic Quality 
(26.35) (12.77) (21.01) (6.35) 
   -0.02  -0.02  average weighted tariff 
   (-12.96)  (-12.95) 
-1.09 -1.08 -0.98 -0.99  log distance 
(-37.14) (-35.92) (-33.82) (-33.39) 
1.07 1.03 1.01 1.04  log product of GDP 
(95.74) (63.85) (95.90) (68.87) 
-0.20 -0.18 -0.16 -0.17  log product of land area 
(-21.65) (-17.98) (-18.75) (-17.80) 
-0.34 -0.36 -0.44 -0.42  no. of landlocked 
(-7.68) (-8.08)  (-10.37)  (-10.04) 
-0.16 -0.21 -0.11 -0.08  common border 
(-3.42) (-4.15) (-2.49) (-1.73) 
0.99 1.03 1.01 0.96  common border 
(6.84) (6.99) (6.63) (6.34) 
0.55 0.54 0.62 0.63  common language 
(9.94) (9.79)  (11.83) (12.00) 
1.92 1.89 1.21 1.22  currency union 
(7.94) (7.80) (5.13) (5.18) 
Observations  77594 77594 32752 32752 
R^2  0.67 0.67 0.74 0.74 
First stage R^2    0.43    0.43 
86% 113% 66%  46%  % increase in trade due 
to 1s.d. institution             
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated 
taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant and year 
dummies are not reported. IV estimators use the sum of 
absolute latitude as an instrument for the sum of bureaucratic 
quality for both countries in a trading pair. The sum of 
bureaucratic quality ranges from 0 to 8 with mean 4.672 and 
standard deviation 1.667. The percent increase in trade due to 
1s.d. institution (bureaucratic quality) is calculated as follows: 
exp(coef*sd)-1. 
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Table A3: Trade and Control of Corruption 
        
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow     
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
    OLS IV OLS IV 
0.27 0.27 0.16 0.14  Control of Corruption 
(25.41) (12.78) (15.41) (6.27) 
   -0.02  -0.02  average weighted tariff 
   (-13.16)  (-12.80) 
-1.09 -1.09 -0.98 -0.99  log distance 
(-37.20) (-36.56) (-33.15) (-32.50) 
1.12 1.12 1.08 1.08  log product of GDP 
(108.96) (96.09) (111.94) (105.28) 
-0.21 -0.21 -0.19 -0.19  log product of land area 
(-23.43) (-22.22) (-21.81) (-21.41) 
-0.36 -0.36 -0.42 -0.42  no. of landlocked 
(-8.08) (-8.02) (-9.98) (-9.81) 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04  no. of islands 
(-0.58) (-0.63) (-1.00) (-0.82) 
0.92 0.92 0.95 0.94  common border 
(6.40) (6.39) (6.33) (6.19) 
0.64 0.65 0.69 0.69  common language 
(11.81) (11.77) (13.19) (13.12) 
2.16 2.17 1.39 1.36  currency union 
(8.65) (8.65) (5.76) (5.65) 
Observations 77594  77594  32752  32752 
R^2 0.67  0.67  0.73  0.73 
First stage R^2    0.40    0.43 
70% 72% 38% 32%  % increase in trade due 
to 1s.d. institution             
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated 
taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant and year 
dummies are not reported. IV estimators use the sum of absolute 
latitude as an instrument for the sum of control of corruption for 
both countries in a trading pair. The sum of control of corruption 
ranges from 0 to 12 with mean 7.012 and standard deviation 
1.972. The percent increase in trade due to 1s.d. institution 
(control of corruption) is calculated as follows: exp(coef*sd)-1. 
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Table A4: Trade and Protection of Property Rights 
       
Dep. Var.: log of average trade flow     
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
    OLS IV OLS IV 
0.30 0.31 0.29 0.13  Protection of Property 
Rights  (20.87) (5.83) (19.01) (2.65) 
   -0.02  -0.02  average weighted tariff 
   (-8.52)  (-8.62) 
-1.21 -1.21 -1.16 -1.14  log distance 
(-49.00) (-48.49) (-45.18) (-43.76) 
0.98 0.97 0.99 1.03  log product of GDP 
(104.85) (50.49) (101.19) (61.21) 
-0.10 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13  log product of land area 
(-11.91) (-6.83) (-11.71) (-10.27) 
-0.55 -0.56 -0.58 -0.55  no. of landlocked 
(-16.02) (-15.42) (-15.97) (-14.47) 
-0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.10  no. of islands 
(-4.07) (-3.63) (-4.12) (-2.07) 
1.08 1.08 1.01 0.99  common border 
(8.62) (8.58) (7.96) (7.69) 
0.50 0.50 0.64 0.71  common language 
(9.97) (8.96)  (12.93) (13.15) 
1.35 1.35 1.08 1.11  currency union 
(5.61) (5.61) (3.03) (3.32) 
Year dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Country dummies  no no no no 
Observations  29772 29772 19536 19536 
R^2  0.71 0.71 0.75 0.74 
First  stage  R^2   0.42  0.42 
55% 59% 52% 22%  % increase in trade due 
to 1s.d. institution             
Notes: t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated 
taking into account country-pair clusters. A constant and year 
dummies are not reported. IV estimators use the sum of absolute 
latitude as an instrument for the sum of protection of property 
rights for both countries in a trading pair. The sum of protection of 
property rights ranges from 0 to 8 with mean 4.962 and standard 
deviation 1.47. The percent increase in trade due to 1s.d. 
institution (property rights) is calculated as follows: exp(coef*sd)-1. 
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